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Abstract 
International Civil Society plays an important role in ‘Peace Building’ efforts 
internationally. This thesis is an analysis of the role that International Civil Society has 
played in working within Colombia to locally facilitate the implementation of the 2016 
Peace Accords Agreement. To do so, I am using a ‘functional framework’ as developed 
in the academic literature, to research what functions are most prevalent in relation to 
local projects they have undertaken categorized as related to the Peace Accords. Overall, 
I found that 3 main functions were prevalent, those of Advocacy, Socialization and 
Monitoring. Whilst the features of Advocacy and Monitoring fit the expected hypothesis, 
the prevalence of the activities in the function of Socialization was unexpected. I believe 
this function is prevalent due to the social and cultural conditions which surrounded the 
buildup and implementation of the Peace Accords, which placed emphasis on creating a 
culture of peace due to the divides that define Colombian life. 
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Chapter 1. 
 
Literature Review and introduction to concepts. 
 
INTRODUCTION TO THE COLOMBIAN CONFLICT 
 
The current conflict within Colombia can be traced to 1958, though some of the grievances that underline 
the conflict extend much further back (see The Peace accords and their Implementation). The ‘conflict’ in this 
case refers to the war between the Colombian state and the FARC-EP, a rural based agrarian movement, born 
from the failed agrarian struggles of the 1930’s and 40’s (LaRosa and Mejia, 2012, pp.96-97), and officially 
formed in 1964 as a response to these widespread problems of land ownership and distribution.  Originally they 
were the armed wing of the Colombian Communist Party, but evolved overtime, becoming more less politically 
motivated, and becoming involved in a variety of escalating criminal activities, such as bombings, kidnappings 
and hijackings, mainly against Colombian targets (Beittel 2015, pp.2-3). They, alongside various other 
burgeoning paramilitary organizations (such as the ELN, formed 1960, and later the AUC, formed in the 1980s) 
all became actors in a continual, ‘low-level’ guerrilla conflict that plagued Colombia for the last 50+ years. 
Adding to this, the 1980s saw the rise of ‘narcotraficantes’, drug trafficking cartels who found the atmosphere of 
war, extrajudicial killings and chaos that defined the governments fight against the paramilitaries and militias a 
unique political and geographical climate to make Colombia the center of the emerging cocaine industry, and all 
its resultant conflicts. All of this contributed to Colombia being a country wrecked by varying states of near-
constant warfare for the last 50+ years; by the 1990s, ‘the FARC and ELN were fighting the military, the AUC 
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[fighting] the leftist guerrillas, the military supposedly the AUC, FARC and the ELN, and the drug barons fighting 
the government’ (ibid 2016 pp.100).  
 
With aid from the USA in the form of ‘Plan Colombia’ in 2000’s, the Colombian state began an aggressive 
campaign, within the global push for a ‘war on drugs’, against the FARC under conservative President Uribe, 
whose policies further exacerbated the conflict. The Colombian countryside quickly became battleground of 
Colombian State/US forces versus FARC-EP militants, with the various other paramilitaries in between, which 
only  ended up effecting the civilians caught in the crossfire most of all. An internal report from 2016 states that 
over the last half-century of warfare, over 220,000 people had been killed, with 4/5ths of them being civilians 
(Basta Ya!). Finally in 2016, under the new Prime Minister Juan Manuel Santos, a peace agreement (which had 
started in 2012) was signed, which resulted in an ‘official’ end of the conflict, promising most crucially the 
demobilization and re-integration of the FARC-EP. 
 
 (A). Conceptualizing Peace-Building; definitions and the shift to 
integrating ‘the local’ through a hybrid approach.  
 
When analyzing efforts at international peace keeping, we must first understand the concept ‘Peace-Building’. 
Peace building as a concept originated in the 1992, and subsequent 1995, ‘Agenda for Peace’ document published 
by the UN (A/47/277). It was closely tied to, but a separate concept from, peacekeeping and peace-making, 
engaged in the range of measures undertaken to prevent effects of war or initiating of armed conflict, looking at 
providing security and constructing frameworks for the progressive developments of affected countries 
(Harpviken and Kjellman 2004, pp.4-5). Over the years, its use has come to be synonymous with the attempts to 
initiate post-conflict transformative efforts in war-torn countries, and to create a long lasting, ‘positive peace’. 
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The debates around effective strategies for peace-building are ongoing and many; whether or not development is 
central, (the ‘inclusivist’ school), or whether it is a security issue, (the exclusivist school); whether it is a gradual 
process beginning after conflict ends, or a dynamic process which operates during and after a conflict, in tandem 
with other peace related efforts; who should be responsible for carrying out what part of peace building (see David 
1999, pp.27-29 for a conclusive summary). Whilst its actual features are fluid and vary in definition, central to 
most definitions are three elements; the (i) ‘reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation of society’, the (ii) 
‘creation of security related, political mechanisms to build trust between parties’ and (iii) ‘an external 
intervention to help create conditions conducive to peace’ (ibid, 1999 pp.27) 
We can trace the theoretical shift within the peace-building literature and practice from starting as an ‘outcome’ 
orientated approach, moving more recently to a more ‘relationship-orientated focus’, manifest as a change from 
traditional, external, ‘short term’ understandings of conflict resolution, to more substantial, ‘localized’ and 
sustainable approaches (The World Bank 2007, pp. 7-8).  
‘Traditional’ peace building, the first iteration of the concept, is work that is seen as undertaken primarily by 
larger international bodies, such as the UN. It is representative of the short-term, outcome-orientated approach, 
which was built upon a normative idea and framework of conceptions of ‘cosmopolitan justice’. Following the 
Cold War, the growth and character of intra-state conflicts pushed the UN to redefine its concepts of responsibility 
and sovereignty (Siegar 2011), moving away from the concept of absolute sovereignty of the state in its own 
domestic affairs. Instead, states that were seen to have violated international normative standards of human rights 
and justice, or were unable to deliver effective ‘security’ to their people in fragile post-conflict periods were seen 
by the UN as in need of benevolent intervention and saw themselves justified in undertaking state-rebuilding 
projects, under the narrative of ‘peace-building’ measures to help support them. Based on this, peace-building 
measures then became intrinsically linked to state building.   
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As peace building measures became associated with state-building though, its implementation by the UN and 
international organizations, in its hierarchical, top down manner, ignorant of local sovereignty began to be 
criticized as implementing a ‘liberal peace model’, which focused on creating ‘standardized’ versions of peace 
building, based on a western conception, that did not actively contribute to positive or sustainable models of peace 
(Mac-Ginty 2006). Adding to this, the ontological basis of intervention, that fragile states and weak governance 
were recognized key cause of conflict and ‘failed states’, and due to the globalized and interconnected nature of 
international society and peacekeeping, peace-building efforts were globalized and outsourced, to prevent a 
rupture in this international order. This led to the paradoxical notion of interventionist state building; sustaining 
the independent nature of international society by infringing upon sovereignty and invading to create peace.  
Authors critical of this liberal peace model thus argue that it; avoids dealing with the roots of conflict and 
diminishes local agency (Paris 1997, Denskus 2007), it bypasses local ownership, concentrating power in weak 
and sometimes corrupt government structures (Shinoda 2018); its focus on ‘market democracy’ simply transplants 
western models to serve development foreign development agendas (Lund 2003). They have also explored nations 
use of the peace building discourse for supporting regime change (Hathershaw 2008, Ramsbotham, et al 1999, 
pp.232,), or how peace-building functions can actually function to negatively ‘de-politicize’ civil society 
(Datzberger 2015).  
This led to calls for critical research to focus on moving away from this ‘liberally imposed’ peace, resulting in a 
reconceptualization of effective peace building as that which comes ‘from below’, based on people power and 
including local, civil society-led approaches (Ramsbotham, et al 2011, pp.233). This approach was instead defined 
by a ‘relationship-orientated’ agenda, and building on the previously limited attempts at truly integrating the 
‘local’ in practice, this ‘relationship-orientated’ approach in peace building theory focused more on agency, 
inclusivity (Donais and McCandless 2016) and the re-centring of power towards local actors in post-conflict 
settings, as a solution to creating effective peace building measures (Mac-Ginty & Richmond 2013). This 
reallocation of power was seen as central to this new concept of peace building, as peace building is an 
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intrinsically political project, focused on redefining and remodeling the relations of society and state, thus power 
must to be re-allocated to succeed (Betram 1995).  
This ‘turn’ in peace building towards a focus on the local can be divided into two lines of research, reflective of 
the larger structure vs. agency debate found in International Relations theory. One understanding of the local in 
peace building recognized the ‘sub-national population’ as an actor in constructing a more ‘effective’ peace, 
supporting and placing emphasis on local governance practices, local capacity and local ownership as important 
factors in successful peace building.   
The other looks at the local as an expression of agency, which is key to the sustaining of and embedding of peace 
norms within new societies (Leonardsson & Rudd 2015), the local is a ‘means of emancipation’ (ibid, pp.3). Both 
these elements overlap, and will be explored in relevance to theorising civil societies in the forthcoming section 
(Civil Societies Role in Peace building).  
Manning’s work argues that one way of understanding successful peace building is done through the extent to 
which national peace accords are extended to a local level, as state building in any form can only be successful if 
it integrates all levels of society, which opens up a space for the role of civil society (Manning 2003).  For 
example, the reintegration of displaced people and ex-soldiers are two local areas where national peace accords 
may fail to become fully realized, but where civil society can operate effectively on a local level (Farris 2008).  
The ‘local’ as a concept in peace-building is not without criticism; Paffenholz argues for a more nuanced approach 
in theorizing the local; in celebrating it, previous studies have placed it and the ‘monolithic’ international liberal 
order as binary opposites, leading to an uncritical romanticizization of ‘the local’ (Paffenholz, 2015 pp.862). In 
using the local as a distinct category, it has become categorised as containing ‘everything that is not the flaws’ of 
the liberal order model; producing a normative categorization rather than a more quantitative one. This binary 
nature prevents it from acting in an inclusive and dynamic way, which is what the local turn was meant to achieve 
initially (Randazzo, 2016).  
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Attempting to practically situate the local in the practice of peace-building, and combining the positives of the 
two approaches (traditional liberal and relationship-orientated local) has led to the development of ‘hybridity 
theory’, which focuses on combining the ‘’compliance and incentive’’ ability of the liberal peace model, with the 
emphasis on ‘’agency and resistance’’ found in localized form of peace building ‘from below’ (MacGinty 2010, 
pp.398-404). This ‘local-liberal’ (Wallis 2012, Richmond 2009) peace building strategy is the form that most 
peace building strategies today try to employ and build upon (at least rhetorically). Works have explored its 
various strengths; it can help maintain peace and security through its compliance and incentive hierarchical 
structure, and its accommodation of local society grants it legitimacy and increases inclusivity (Anam 2018, pp.5-
7).   
As to its weaknesses, Paffenholz’s notes how as well as having various power and agency problems, those critical 
of liberal peace models unequivocally celebrate the hybridity approach despite its intertwining of ‘obsolete liberal 
peace and the local structures (,) as a positive achievement’ (2015, pp. 864). Furthermore, the local as a ‘form of 
resistance’ found in many accounts of both hybrid and local model celebrators (such as MacGinty 2011, or Anam 
2018) lacks an empirical base and is overly romanticized; Hirblinger and Simons (2015) work calls for a more 
critical self-reflection on the representation of the local by scholars within peace building literature. The context, 
characteristics and effectiveness of local level peace building is constructed through the recognition of what is 
and is not ‘authentic’ local civil society, an academically debatable definition. Therefore, recognizing one’s own 
role in constructing the local is an important part of any analysis of the mobilization of the local as a unit of 
analysis. Some authors contend that this fluid notion of what is and isn’t the local should in fact be embraced, 
rejecting a ‘one-size fits all model’ and understanding the ‘local turn’ in peace-building within a context based 
analysis and methodology, specifically one that involves the ‘local’ themselves (Schierenbeck 2015).  
Based on this review of literature it is clear that the idea of integrating ‘the local’ in a hybrid manner is now the 
orthodox approach, and current academic and practical attempts (criticisms not withstanding) are based on a 
recognition of the success of the theory of hybridity. Further research should seek to progress this by developing 
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an understanding of what the manifestations, consequences and observable operations of the local in peace 
building strategies are then, rather than simply describing its presence. 
 
(B). Conceptualizing Civil Society and introduction to the Functional 
Approach.  
Civil society (CS) is a vague concept that has evaded efforts to be decisively pinned down. The exact nature of 
what constitutes it, and the area it acts, is broad and varied, and various debates exist regarding definition and 
effective measurement. It is argued to vary in definition from case to case due to historical context (Rosenblum 
& Post, 2002), and vary in definition in developed vs. developing countries (Scott 2003). Bunyan (2013) argues 
it should be understood as a ‘normative political concept’; this approach is equally countered as applying norms 
based on the intellectual heritage of western culture; thus to counter this it should be conceptualized ‘from the 
bottom up’ (Oxhorn 2006), (particularly in the case of Latin America). Attempting to move past the debate on 
definition, Harpviken and Kjellman argue that the vagueness in concept means that rather than understanding CS 
as a clearly defined notion, we should see it as a “sensitizing term’ that helps us quantify and operationalize actors 
(2004, pp.4), and its inability to be decisively pinned down thus gives it flexibility as a quantifying term. 
At its core, it defines actors in a larger political framework; K.Anheir’s work describes it as; constituted of ‘’the 
sum of institutions, organizations, and individuals located among the family, the state and the market, in which 
people associate voluntarily to advance common interests’’ (2004, pp.2-3). It operates ‘between’ both state and 
the market, influencing and influenced by the contesting differences between the two, and in all cases ‘voluntary 
association’ dominates definitions of civil society relations (ibid, 2004). It is separate and distinct from the state 
and politics, remaining formally and legally independent, but in practice often orientates itself towards and 
 12 
interacts closely within them, working with and clashing with both (Spurk 2010, pp.6-7). Examples can vary from 
social, religious or professional organizations (Harpviken and Kjellman 2004, pp.5). 
Lewis work helps us identify the two strands of discourse on civil societies ‘role’ that have emerged, each dealing 
with a different ‘part’ of the world and based on their historical contexts. The role of civil society has been 
conceptualised in the West, (within neo-liberal global ideologies), as part of a ‘virtuous circle’ of state, economy 
and market, which seeks to integrate it into a privatised agenda and operate its functions in co-operation with the 
state. In this role, it does not possess much radical agenda, instead integrated and part of systems of governance. 
A more radical conception, rooted in a Gramscian1 understanding of culture and hegemony and related to the 
agency of the global south, sees it as a space that develops ‘cultural variety’, where it can act to challenge or 
sustain hegemonic power (Lewis 2002, pp. 571-572). In reality, different CS act in different roles, rather than 
having one specific role, it often merges and moves between the two relative to circumstance. 
Promoting CS in post-conflict zones is seen as a key link to effective peace building (see section (D) 
Conceptualizing Civil Society’s Role in supporting Post-Conflict Peace-building). In understanding this link, 
Spurk (2010) develops on the two ways this can be done; the ‘actor-orientated approach’, and the ‘functional 
approach’. His work shows the shortcomings of the actor orientated approach and advocates for a functional 
approach (2010, pp.20-24), to fully allow for the dynamic nature and wide variation of CSOs. Whilst this 
functional approach is not without criticism (see Datzberger and Nguyen, 2018, pp.11-18), my reasons for using 
it in this case will be explored in the section (iii) ‘Developing the Functional approach for an analysis of 
                                                 
1 Gramscian here meaning ideas related to cultural hegemony and the ‘historic bloc. See Cox, R, ‘Gramsci, 
Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method’ for a more detailed summary of Gramsci’s work 
and the link with International Relations.  
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International Civil Society Organisations’. Using this functional approach, I will examine the role of international 
CSO’s in facilitating the implementation of Peace Accords on a local level, which is key to peace building.  
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(C). Conceptualizing Civil Society’s Role in supporting Post-Conflict 
Peace-building. 
Following the evolution in conceptualization of peace building towards ‘from below’ and move towards the local, 
the role of CSO’s in this process has become recognized. John Lederachs (1997) work clarifies this division, with 
his 3 tiered approach to peace building, showing the different levels of actors, from ‘top leadership’ to ‘grassroots 
leadership’, and their corresponding approaches to peace-building (see figure (i) from; Lederach, 1997). This 
work demonstrates the difference in both capacity and organization that the ‘local’ has over top-down approaches, 
and the space for integration between local, national and international bodies, often exemplified by CSO’s. This 
place of CSO’s in peace-building efforts has been explored by numerous authors, exploring the role, types, 
features of success and place in peace-building initiatives. 
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Figure (i) 
 
The vast majority of research supports the fact that civil society involvement in peace building, in particular their 
inclusion in peace accords implementation, is productive and influential (Nilsson 2014, 2012); the durability of 
peace accords is proven to be directly proportional to level of involvement of CSO’s, (Wanis-St. John and Kew 
2008), due to a variety of factors.  
They offer several advantages from not being attached to the ‘formal political process’; civil society groups often 
have independence from national or transnational influence and the ability to act when ‘official’’ channels cannot, 
such as facilitating dialogue with militant movements and government officials, ‘track 2’ dialogue, like in the 
cases of South Africa, Guatemala or Northern Ireland. On a local level, they help create a ‘pragmatic peace’, 
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facilitating the broader peace decisions of the national to a more localized context and helping people settle 
grievances and move on with their lives (Barnes 2005).  
In work exploring the integration of local civil resistance and peace building, Dudouet analyses the role of civil 
society in resistance, in the four stages of conflict transformation. In particular, in stage 4, ‘supporting 
transformative peace building’, civil society has a constructive element, preparing society for post-conflict 
measures; she uses the examples of democracy in South Africa to demonstrate how the institutions and 
mechanisms in place from civil society resistance to apartheid became embodied and reflected in the new 
constitution and its unique approach to peace building (2017, pp 27-30). 
Despite their proven influence and important role in peace building, Fischer’s work argues for caution; the role 
of CSO’s in most cases is one of a supportive role, rather than a decisive one; they often operate in tandem with 
diplomatic and national state efforts at peace building, in an ‘intermeshed and parallel process’ (2006, pp.18). 
This integrated process is most successful when built from the bottom up, with integration of civil societies from 
the beginning of peace building, as this broadens the support base considerably and is one of the key ways of 
integrating marginalised groups, such as women, often excluded (see UN 1352), from key negotiations into peace 
building (Paffenholz, T., 2009a, Fischer 2006). Thus there supportive role is dependent on state help. 
This supportive role manifests itself differently in each scenario; there are often a multitude of civil society actors 
and approaches in any given peace building situation, engaged in various roles. Overall, civil society groups have 
been noted to be most effective when they engage in efforts to promote protection of people, monitoring of crime, 
and facilitation for people in need, whereas attempts at socialisation and specifically increasing ‘conflict sensitive’ 
social cohesion are less successful (Paffenholz, T, 2009b). They can facilitate more general civil participation in 
political processes, legitimising burgeoning political structures which help promote peace and security, and 
providing information to both civilians and governments (Ferris 2008). They have been shown to facilitate 
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vulnerable people (such as internally displaced persons) involvement in formal peace-building mechanisms, 
providing pathways to representation for those who would not have so otherwise (Ferris 2009). 
Other work offers a more balanced view on the role of civil society in peace-building. Carother questions the 
extent to which civil society is always a benign force; he argues that it can work to advance both good and bad 
causes, and so we should be tempered in our assessment of civil society’s contribution to peace building. It has 
potential both as a positive, but also negative force, as ‘civil society’ as unit of study represents ‘the good, the 
bad, and the outright bizarre’ (Carother 1999, pp.20).  Chambers and Kopstein (2001) also argue for caution, 
highlighting the need to examine these ‘bad civil societies’ alongside the good. If a ‘strong civil society’ helps 
build a strong peace, what kind of peace would be built by a strong, yet ‘bad’ civil society organisation?   
As a key component of peace building, CS is also susceptible to the criticism of imposing the standardized liberal 
model of peace, and can serve as a channel to impose a certain political order on post-conflict societies. Often, 
international civil society is dependent upon, and thus reflective of, their western donor’s wishes (see AbouAssi 
2012). Paris argues that we should avoid these ‘pathologies of liberalisation’ (2006, pp. 235) present in top-down 
liberal peace building attempts from certain CS actors, as they are a disruptive and conflict-prone approach, which 
many vulnerable post-conflict states are unable to deal with. Instead, his work argues that peace building should 
focus on constructing solid foundations of political society.  In this sense, Brown argues that firstly, to function, 
the state within which CS operates must be strong enough to provide security, yet no too strong as to be oppressive 
and pose a threat to the search and individual acquisition of civil liberties by its citizens (Brown 2000, pp13). The 
‘hybrid’ peace approach explored earlier attempts to deal with these criticisms, using a combination of the ‘liberal 
peace’ resources and mobilization, combined with local actor agency to encourage the growth of local CS.  The 
‘local turn’ in peace building since the 1990s also explored in the previous section, focusing on local actor agency, 
then prompts the question of ‘What is the functioning role of international CSO’s in this new ‘local process’’? 
Do they operate with or above the new ‘turn’ towards local peace building, part of or separate from the ‘hybrid’ 
approach outlined? These questions are what have led to my research question; I will attempt to integrate the 
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findings of the review and state of the academic literature in relevance to the situation in Colombia. To do so, we 
must categorize how these international CSO’s operate, which will be done through a functional framework to 
analyse them. 
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(D). Colombia, its Civil Society and the Peace Accords. 
 
COLOMBIAN CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
 Civil Society, both local and international, has played an active role in Colombian peace building for 
nearly the whole time this conflict has been active. Colombia has the highest number of registered Civil Society 
Organisations (CSO’s) per capita in the Americas, (with the exception of the USA), with each sector equally 
represented, no one area representing greater than 33% of the total (Evans, C. 2016). Various manifestations, 
from churches to NGO’s, on both the local and regional level, have work in an integrated way, with and without 
international assistance to provide programs and avenues for peace, whilst the peace process was ongoing or 
stalled (Bouvier 2004). These civil societies have faced consistent threats to life from violence and kidnapping, 
from all sides of the conflict; left and right wing militias, as well as attacks from the Colombian military and state.  
 
WHAT IS THE ROLE OF LOCAL CIVIL SOCIETY IN COLOMBIA? 
 
In Colombia, the integration of local and national peace initiative from civil society is uniquely prevalent. 
From the 1980’s onwards, along with the massive mobilization from national and regional peace movements in 
favor of peace, (in the forms of pro-peace and pro-democracy movements), grass-roots initiatives began to take 
shape, inspired by the idea that sustainable peace was to be built ‘locally’, and inspired by similar movements in 
places such as the Philippines. In the early 1990s, these local level initiatives began to visibly flourish in a variety 
of forms. For example, between the years 1998-2002, more than 100 local peace ‘experincas’ (experiments) were 
established, in spite of fierce opposition from armed actors (Mitchell and Rojas 2012, pp. 41-42). These 
‘experincas’ took on many forms, from traditional protest and striking movements to conflict-neutral ‘peace 
communities’, set up to try and negate the effects of the conflict. 
 20 
 
Grass-roots peace building efforts like these eventually became integrated into the national discourse on 
peace building strategy due to their effectiveness; these broad local level approaches to peace-building, 
encompassing the ‘experincas’ and more can be described as local peace-building initiatives (LBI). They 
consisted of two main types; ‘Development and Peace programmes’ and ‘Laboratories of Peace’ (Rodriguez 
2012, pp.70). Development and Peace programmes were ‘systems of co-ordination’ (ibid, pp.71), an umbrella 
term for systems made up of various organizations that emerged from local civil society efforts to encourage 
human development in a pluralistic and autonomous way. ‘Laboratories of Peace’ were zones which developed 
paths of dialogue and peaceful resistance; they sought to create ‘political, cultural, social and economic 
transformations leading to lasting peace’ through experimenting with peace initiatives within their self-identified 
territory (ibid, pp.73).   
 
 These two types of LBI’s were quickly replicated across the country, and importantly, included in the 
2014 ‘National Development Plan’ (Colombian National Development Plan: All for a New Country), which is 
Colombia’s official plan on development strategy for the country, 2014-2018. As well as a clear indication of the 
extent to which local peace had become ‘nationalized’, by becoming included into the official public discourse 
around development, these LBI’s also became part of the strategies of development that the negotiations that 
produced the Peace Accords drew upon, specifically the sections dealing with post-conflict development 
initiatives.    
 
Therefore, as well as working to negate the effects of armed conflict, local civil societies were crucial in 
shaping the conditions and providing input into what issues were eventually included in, and central to, the Peace 
Accords. The agreement that was signed in November 2016 was not only a result of negotiations from FARC and 
the government, but also the massive mobilization and input from local Civil Society.  
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THE PEACE ACCORDS AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION 
 
The Peace Accords negotiations officially began in 2012. Following the election of President Juan Manuel 
Santos, who had campaigned on his expressed intention to end the conflict (Romo, 2010), and preceded by secret 
talks between FARC-EP and the Colombian government (see FARC-EP International), official peace talks 
opened in September 2012 in Havana, Cuba and concluded in November 2016, taking the form of the ‘Peace 
Accords’. Despite being initially rejected in a plebiscite from the public in October, 50.2% to 49.8%, the 
agreements were quickly redrafted and ratified, pushed through parliament regardless and signed on November 
24th 2016 (BBC News, 2016), officially marking the end of the Colombian conflict, and giving a unique example 
of a peace agreement conducted in good faith, with solid commitments to peace visible from each party.  
The final Peace Accords themselves consisted of six sections relating to what was identified as the root 
causes of conflict in Colombia; (i). Rural Development, (ii). Political Participation, (iii). Illicit Drug use, (iv). 
The Reconciliation for Victims, (v). Ending of Armed Conflict and (vi) Implementation and Verification 
Mechanisms (The Office of the High Commissioner for Peace 2016, Summary Of Colombia's Agreement To End 
Conflict And Build Peace 2016).  Each section was agreed upon separately throughout the years 2013-2016, and 
contained detailed provisions within to address the issues raised pertinent to each problem.  
 
These were not the first attempts at peace within Colombia; they followed three previous failed attempts; 
one in 1982/84-89, one in 1990-92 and one from 1998- 2000. Each of these failed for a variety of individual and 
contextual reasons (see González Posso 2004 for a summary), but scholars have also noted that all these previous 
attempts shared ‘identical patterns of failure’ (Azcarate 2003). Notably, one key area was their use of what is 
described as ‘Inadequate Procedure’; a ‘lack of recognition of powerful subjective dynamics’ (Ibid, 2003), which 
manifested as the use of only direct ‘track one’ negotiations, between FARC and the government, that did not 
give a voice to ‘third parties’ and thus key constituents. The Peace talks that began in 2012 differed in this regard, 
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particularly as it was civil society organizations input that came to represent these ‘third parties’ absent from 
previous negotiations. 
 
In measuring the current state of the peace accords implementation, we can use the data provided by the 
University Of Notre Dame’s Kroc institute for International Peace Studies. They were mandated through Section 
(vi) Implementation and verification mechanisms of the Colombian Peace Accords to monitor the state of the 
implementation of the content of the peace agreement. In November 2017, they released an executive report 
detailing efforts so far. Overall, they found that, as of August 2017, 251 stipulations (45%) of the agreement had 
been implemented, with most achievements being found in disarmament, ceasefires and implementation of some 
verification mechanisms. Longer term, the issues of indigenous political rights, political participation guarantees 
(up to 80% not achieved) and women’s rights were identified as ‘medium term measures’, and land reform and 
redistribution and programmes dealing with the substitution of illicit crops had made ‘little progress’ (Kroc 
Institute Report, 2017). From this, we can already extrapolate that work from civil society dealing with political 
rights and participation, land issues and peoples human rights are areas that are likely to still be worked on in 
Colombia. 
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Chapter 2 
Developing the Functional approach for an analysis of International 
Civil Society Organizations.  
 
 To observe CS peace building indicators, there are two main approaches identified in the literature; an 
‘actor-orientated’ approach, which quantifies groups and analyses them based on the actors present, or a 
‘functional’ analysis, which uses a framework of specific functions to analyse groups.  
Usage of either presents different problems; for an ‘actor orientated approach’, most often the actors or activities 
that are recognized as ‘civil society’ are those rooted in a Euro-centric, ‘western-donor’ conception of what civil 
society is, and so can miss out on the myriad of various groups and organizations that may not fit to a standard 
definition. This problem is of particular importance to avoid when analysing international civil society groups 
work operating in non-western countries (see Datzberger and Nguyen 2018 pp.9 -11 for a full analysis of 
limitations), as in this case of international (often-western) civil society groups operating in Colombia.  
Work by both Spurk (2010), and Paffenholz (2009b), develop arguments for using a functional analysis over this 
actor based one. They argue that the ‘functional’ approach is best to judge both outcome, and applicability, of 
civil society groups, and allows for a wider range of groups to be included in any analysis undertaken, as 
essentially the function of the group, rather than the constitution of the group (actor-based approach) is the 
quantifying element.  
This functional approach though has also been criticized, as it is seen as relying on measuring via a predetermined 
desirable outcome, on which to identify and observe these identified functions; these ‘fixed indicators’, essentially 
pre-determined outcomes or indicators which are searched for, fail to allow for an analysis which represents the 
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dynamic and shifting nature of civil society activity, and prevent an in-depth impact evaluation, especially that 
within a post-conflict/non-western environment. Positive examples derived from a functional analysis, based on 
evaluations utilizing these ‘fixed indicators’, (such as campaigns, or number of workshops undertaken), do not 
translate to necessarily representing or demonstrating actual long-lasting or impactful measures of success. CS 
work is argued to only truly be successful when it reflects the extent to which ‘norms and values’ are ingrained 
into peoples ‘minds and hearts’ (Datzberger and Nguyen 2018, pp. 11-12). Fixed indicators are too static to fully 
produce observable evidence of these.  
Despite this, as my thesis is not an impact evaluation assessment, (which in the current case of the Colombian 
Peace Accords is impossible due to several limitations2), these criticisms of the functional analysis have been 
noted, but will not undermine my usage of the framework for my specific research purpose, in constructing a 
typology (this will be developed more in the section Research Outline and Methodology).  
I will be using a functional framework developed by the World Bank (2007), and found also in work by Spurk 
and Paffenholz (2010), consisting of seven ‘functions’ that civil society undertakes, linked to international peace 
building measures. These are; (i) protection, (ii) monitoring/early warning systems, (iii) advocacy, (iv) 
socialization; (v) conflict sensitive social cohesion, (vi) intermediation/ facilitation and (vii) service provision 
(World Bank 2007).  Each function has its own advantages and disadvantages, and is visible to different extents 
in the various stages of peace-building efforts. I will very briefly outline the contents of each section, as well as 
the stage at which they are most likely to be prevalent, as they will be elaborated on more within their relevant 
findings/analysis section of the thesis. These functions will form the quantitative categorization of my data.  
                                                 
2  The contemporary nature of the subject matter means that the long term impacts of civil society groups in 
Colombia is not effectively measurable currently. 
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(i) Protection. 
Civil society engages in this function both during and after conflict, as during both, the weakened state is often 
unable to deliver protection for the civilian population (World Bank, 2007 pp.17). It consists of ‘international 
accompaniment, watchdog activities, creation of zones of peace, humanitarian aid, and civil society initiatives 
for human security’ (Tuhaise 2010). Of the functions, this one most often involves supporting, directly or 
indirectly, local and national CSO’s. This functions effectiveness can be increased when combined with advocacy 
and monitoring campaigns (Paffenholz 2010, pp.15), and whilst it does decrease in prevalence in post-conflict 
environments due to the decreased need, it is a ‘key precondition’ for civil society to engage in other forms of 
activism (ibid, pp. 20).    
(ii) Monitoring/Early Warning Systems 
This function, consisting of observing and recording activities, is a peace building method based on  enhancing 
accountability, and is relevant at all stages of a conflict situation (World Bank 2007, pp.17). It has been shown to 
increase the durability of peace agreements, and is most effective when its reflects the capacities and purpose of 
the CS group involved, and is combined with technical and political support (Ross 2017). Research also shows 
that the monitoring of specific issues is just as effective as monitoring in general (Paffenholz 2010, pp.15). 
(iii) International Advocacy  
This is the core of many forms of Peace Building, highly relevant and highly successful in many cases 
(Paffenholz 2010, pp.15). CSO’s promote and advocate on behalf of issues relevant to peace building, and the 
work of peace builders in their specific country and International Civil society can take up both domestic and 
global issues. During post-conflict situations, this kind of work focuses most on advocating for continued and 
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diligent implementations of peace agreements, or on behalf of marginalised victims who are still suffering from 
leftover conflict specific issues (World Bank 2007, pp.19). 
(iv) Socialization. 
Socialization aims to ‘inoculate a culture of peace’, and incudes dialogue programmes, reconciliation, 
training, education, peace initiatives and capacity building (World Bank 2007, pp.20). This function emerges after 
large-scale violence has decreased (often in post-conflict situations), as people are able to focus on more social 
issues rather than survival. When performed by international civil society, it has been found to have low levels of 
effectiveness in sustaining peace, due to ‘deep in-group identities, existing within institutions’, which are not 
countered by small numbers of NGO work (Civil Society in Peace Processes at a Glance 2016, pp. 3). 
(v) Conflict Sensitive Social Cohesion (CSSC) 
Similar to socialization, this function focuses on bringing people from adversarial groups together into 
dialogue and recognition (Paffenholz 2010, pp.15) and restoring ‘social capital’ between warring parties (World 
Bank 2007, pp.20). The focus is on joint associations and activities, designed to mix communities and build ties 
between them to facilitate a more peaceful and deeper reintegration and justice process. Studies comparing the 
success rate to that of Socialization efforts found CSSC to actually be more effective in some cases, than the work 
of socialization orientated civil society’s functions (Ohanyan, A., with Lewis, J. 2005, referenced in World Bank 
2007, pp.21). 
(vi) Intermediation and Facilitation  
This function consists of intermediating between different groups and the state, and facilitation initiatives 
between and for warring (mid-conflict) or at-odds (post-conflict) groups (World Bank 2007, pp.21). More 
important during a conflict, this function does have limited use post-conflict, in helping settle differences from 
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parties that may feel under represented or lack agency. It can be performed by both international and national 
groups (Paffenholz 200, pp.16).  
(vii) Service Provision 
The extent to which service provision is even actually seen as a function of peace building is debated within 
the literature, and is only relevant when ‘used as an entry point for other civil society peace building functions’ 
(Paffenholz 2010, pp.21). Thus, its operation within peace building is more to create entry points for further 
activity than the direct influence or engagement of provision. It is seen as a task for the state moreover, and 
involves humanitarian, short-term outcome orientated approaches rather than long-term peace building operations 
(World Bank 2007, pp.22). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 28 
Chapter 3 
 
Hypothesis 
Based on a summary of the literature review, current research and the framework developed previously, my 
hypothesis is that international civil society organizations working in Colombia will firstly, all most clearly use 
or attempt to project an image of using, a ‘hybrid’ approach to peace building, integrating and supporting 
activities of local organizations in their attempts to broaden the implementation of the peace accords, rather than 
initiating or taking the lead on activities themselves. This is due to the ‘local turn’ in peace-building theorization, 
along with the already existent links that have been formed between international, national and localized groups 
within Colombia due to its high level of civil society integrative activity in the past decades. This will be evident 
in a variety of ways, from engaging or supporting a group directly, or operating on their behalf abroad with 
observable links to the local organisation.  
Based on the framework provided by the World Bank (2007), as well as the work of Paffenholz (2007) exploring 
which functions are most successful, and alongside the report of the Kroc institute on the current state of the 
implementation of the Peace Accords, found in ‘The Peace Accords and their Implementation, I predict that the 
most examples that will be found of civil society mobilization will be groups with the functions of the following; 
monitoring, facilitation and advocacy. As well as being the most successful, therefore most likely to be evidenced 
functions that Civil Society can engage in, these are functions that are currently lacking in implementation from 
the Colombia state, and functions that are most useful/prevalent within the context of a post-conflict situation.  
Due to the high levels of violence still facing post-conflict Colombian Citizens, from the threats and problems 
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created by the paramilitary and drug trafficking industries mentioned in the opening section, I also expect that 
protection functions will also be identified.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Research outline and Methodology.  
 To answer my research, I will ask the question ‘’Have International Civil Society Organizations mobilized 
to facilitate an increased local implementation of the Peace Accords Agreement in Colombia, and if so, in what 
functions?’’. My research design will take the form of case study research, focusing on a within-case collection 
and analysis of activities undertaken by international civil society organizations within Colombia, from the years 
2016-2018. I have chosen a within case analysis, as the in-depth research that is used can help to develop and 
understand; theoretical propositions, including, (pertinent in this specific case), the development of a typology 
(L.Paterson 2010, pp.2) (in the case of this thesis, the functions of civil society most prevalent in supporting the 
peace accords). 
The methodology employed will consist of an analysis of self-produced quantitative research, gathered from 
collecting and cataloging numerous individual examples of CSO’s activity in facilitation of the Colombian Peace 
Accords, and analyzing and interpreting this data by the ‘function’ that each example constitutes.  
Why Colombia? 
I have chosen Columbia as a case study for analyzing civil society mobilization for the following reasons; The 
Colombian Peace Accords are one of the most comprehensive and ambitious peace accords to be implemented 
following a period of long lasting violent conflict. The themes it seeks to address span almost all of the identified 
problems and causes of conflict in Colombia over the last 50 years, thus exploring its dynamics will produce data 
that could be used for comparable purposes in similar countries. Its particular inclusion of international monitoring 
and verification bodies (for example, the inclusion of the Kroc Institute to monitor the implementation, as 
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explored earlier) mean that there is both a large amount, and clear indication, of data on the process of the accords. 
The long lasting dynamics of the conflict also mean that all 6 functions of Civil Society groups developed in my 
framework are likely to be present and so provide a valuable case study to analyse. Colombia’s history of Civil 
Society engagement and further produce a wealth of information to develop upon. 
Within Case Analysis 
The use of a within case analysis can provide interesting and useful data, due to their uniqueness and in-depth 
analysis of specific data, providing a fuller understanding of the specific phenomenon investigated (L. Paterson, 
2010). In this case, I will look for, and compare, how patterns fit with already developed predicted theory on the 
functions of civil society peace building that are most prevalent in post-conflict societies, in the specific context 
of post-conflict Colombia.  
Furthermore, within case analysis’ can ‘reveal new insights’ and highlight certain things that may be overlooked 
in larger studies. They have limitations though; if the case is too dense, or the data constrained by too many 
concepts, the results will be of limited use (ibid 2010, pp.4-5). To counter this, certain descriptive parts of the 
thesis, in particular the section exploring the Peace Accords and their sub-sections, will serve as a data reduction 
strategy, to help sort the data into manageable and focused amount. 
SAMPLING  
Based on the concepts explored in the literature review, the examples of ‘civil society’ that have been processed 
have been drawn from numerous places. Any group that fits into Anheir’s (2004) definition of civil society, and 
is working in Colombia has been considered as a source of potential examples. For example, one main source of 
such data that fit these criteria was the list of international organizations listed under peace building data from 
the organization ‘peaceinsight’ ("Colombia: Conflict and Peace" 2018).  
DATA COLLECTION 
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I have gathered the data necessary for developing a quantitative analysis of civil society organizations myself 
from researching the dynamics of CSO mobilization in Colombia noted above. My collection of data has been 
found through analyzing secondary data and primary sources produced by these civil societies, as well as 
secondary literature that has observable description/evidence of civil society activity, to find positive examples 
of facilitation. I have gathered this data by analysing all the potential research sources (CSO’s) activities, as 
identified in the ’Sampling’ section, against self-developed criteria produced from research identifying the six 
sections of the Peace Accords, outlined in the chapter ‘The Peace Accords and it implementation.’ Any 
observation of an ‘activity’, in the form of a self-published report, newspaper article or other verifiable secondary 
source done by an international civil society group in the years 2016-2018 in Colombia, that can be categorized 
as operating within one of the six clauses outlined in the Peace Accords, has been counted as a positive example 
of civil society mobilization in favour of the peace accords. These include any project initiated post-November 
2016, projects that were already underway before the passing of the Peace Accords with the expressed expectation 
of facilitating peace building, and projects already underway that have notably adapted themselves to facilitating 
the peace accords. They will be presented in the section ‘findings/results’, split into the most observable functions. 
Each example of a function will be counted as an individual and separate example when it is performed by a civil 
society organisation. Continuous or multiple cases of a function being performed by the same civil society will 
only count as ‘one’.  
In choosing my sources for data collection, I am constrained by three main considerations; firstly, the need to use 
English sources, hence why I have chosen to look at the work of international civil societies and their co-operation 
with localized Colombian groups, rather than a within case analysis of national Colombian groups. The inability 
to translate sources has diminished my ability to collect data directly from Colombian civil societies, as many of 
their reports are in Spanish. A more in-depth look at the work of national level/local Colombian civil society 
mobilizing in reaction to the peace accords would be an interesting area of study for further research that could 
be combined with the findings from this thesis.   
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Secondly, my case selection relies on documents provided or published largely by CSO groups themselves, thus 
they make be likely to overstate their influence or publish only ‘successful’ examples of their work, so my results 
should be interpreted in consideration of this. I hope by integrating secondary literature I can reduce the impact 
of this bias/one-sided information source that may be present in my primary documents, alongside any other 
biases that I may inadvertently replicate due to my inability to speak Spanish.  
Finally, as this research has been undertaken by me, it is limited by both the time and scope. The inability to 
perform fieldwork and deadline mean that I will most likely have missed some cases, but I hope that my findings 
will be conclusive enough to produce a definitive answer to my research question, and provide a theoretical 
proposition/conclusion inclusive enough that will fit other cases that have been missed.  
DATA ANALYSIS  
To answer my research question, I have split my research focus into two sub-sections, each dealing with a specific 
research agenda, which will be answered in order. Firstly, the extent to which the CSO mobilization gathered is 
‘local’, and secondly, an examination into the most commonly found function that CSO’s manifest themselves 
within this specific case study. 
To research the extent to which the data, firstly, supports or negates my hypothesis about a ‘local turn’ in peace 
building, all of the positive examples found will be analysed discursively, to see if the proposed activity has 
evidence of a collaboration or integration with a distinctly ‘Colombian’ civil society. Evidence of activities that 
involve collaboration with Colombian civil society is expected to be found in early all of the case studies due to 
the context of the Peace Accords and the situation in Colombia.  
For my second sub-question, to produce an analysis of the data that will aid in answering my research question, I 
will use the theoretical functional framework developed earlier for analysing CSO’S, and separate my data 
produced into the seven ‘functions’ of CSO’s to determine what, if any, trends occur in relation to facilitating the 
Peace Accords. From this I will have a descriptive data set relating to specific instances of facilitation of the peace 
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accords and its specific ‘’function’’. I will then be able to develop an analysis in the later section regarding the 
most prevalent and least prevalent function, as well as observe any casual links between type of function and its 
related Peace Accord clause.  
These ‘trends’ are the key elements in my data, and can be understood as ‘themes’. For a within case qualitative 
analysis, Ayres (Ayres, Kavanaugh and Knafl 2003) states that these key elements or themes must be 
‘contextualized into propositions about the sample’ (ibid, pp.881), and for successful qualitative research, must 
be developed and interact with each other. The result of a qualitative analysis is a generalization, and for a within 
case analysis, this is the observable presence of key themes within in the data. For an increased richness in depth 
and detail, Ayres et al (ibid) recommends the use of both within and across case analysis.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Findings; Positive instances of Civil Society Mobilization in regards to 
facilitation of Peace Accords.  
I will now present my findings divided into the seven functions that CSO’s have been identified to operate via, 
with a brief description of the relating Peace Accord clause and level of local integration. In the section ‘Analysis’, 
I will develop these findings further with a more in-depth look at the context and theoretical interpretations that 
explain the data, focusing on the individual function being elaborated on. Certain activities performed by CSO’s 
can be placed within two or more functions, as they often overlap. These cases will also be noted and developed 
upon in the section ‘Analysis’.  
1. Monitoring/Early Warning systems.   
Of the cases reviewed, eight activities found, from a range of different CSO’s, fit the qualifier of performing the 
function of monitoring. One of these, the work of Swiss CSO ‘ask!’’ was not found to be directly related to 
facilitating a section of Peace Accord, focused instead on industry rights for Swiss companies in Colombia.  
Of the remaining seven, three were identified as facilitating the section ‘Enabling Political Participation’ section 
(ii) of the Peace Accords, and three for the facilitation of ‘Agreements on the Reconciliation of Victims of the 
Conflict’, section (v). The remaining one activity identified as performing a monitoring function was the work of 
the Kroc Institute explored in the early section, who were included in the Peace Accord themselves and whose 
work produces the official reports on the implementation of the clauses of the Peace Accord.  
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The six activities identified as facilitating sections (ii) and (v) of the Accords had a clear indication of local level 
integration, involving supporting or acting on behalf of local grass-roots Colombian Civil Society Organizations.  
In the case of section (ii), this local level support was; a letter addressed to a high ranking American diplomat 
listing the cases of political victims, and signed by a combination of local and national CSO’s; a report on the 
murder of two activists, with information integrated from local civil society groups own publishing’s and the 
development of a ‘tool-kit’ to further enhance their own and local CSO’s ability to monitor and report on 
violations.  
For the section (v), the local level integration was in the form of a report on human rights victims which had over 
40 Colombian and non-Colombian contributors; a monitoring workshop co-hosted by a Colombian CSO and 
ground level investigation and monitoring of a series of disappearance along a river, in co-operation with local 
CSO’s. 
 
2. Protection  
I predicted that for the function of Protection, a substantial amount of cases would be found. Despite this, overall, 
only three positive instances of individual CSO mobilizations were found. This can be explained as post-conflict, 
protection functions have been noted to decrease, and are difficult in conflict areas for CSO’s to perform. All 
three of the instances of protection were related to section (ii) of the Peace Accords, facilitating ‘Political 
Participation’; working to increase the political capability of actors within Colombia by protecting them against 
threats.  
Regarding the form that they took, all three were in the form of ‘accompaniments’; sending trained members of 
their organizations to work alongside people in Colombia, in non-combat advisory role to deter attacks.  
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Due to physical nature of protection work, all three also presented clear instances of local level integration; one 
group investigated deaths along a section of river, in conjunction with two of the ‘leading and longest serving 
civil society organizations in Colombia’. Another provided physical accompaniment to local level human rights 
activists, and the third example was a wide range of accompaniments to indigenous and local groups within the 
Choco region. All three also integrated their protection work with international advocacy and monitoring 
functions, using their experiences on the ground and visible presence to push for changes relative to their specific 
campaign.    
3. International Advocacy  
For the function of International Advocacy and increased public communication, there were 10 distinct examples 
of this function being performed from international CSO’s, undertaken post-2016 in support of the Peace Accords. 
Of these 10, 6 were for section (v) Agreements of the Reconciliation of Victims of the Conflict, 2 for section (iii) 
End of Conflict guarantees,  1 for section (vi) Implementation and Verification Methods and 1 for section (ii) 
Increased Political Participation.  
For the activities facilitating section (v), all of the examples had at least some level of local level recognition or 
integration in the activity, as to be expected due to the subject matter in this case being the victims of the 
Colombian conflict. These will be developed in the section ‘Analysis’ (or right here?) 
For the 2 activities that were performed in favor of section (iii) of the Accords, 1 of them showed a weak/very 
indirect indication of local level integration, in the form of applying pressure to the Colombian government to 
stick to the agreements of the ceasefire, but without any mention of the national level or local level civil society 
that it effects. The other activity showed a clear indication of local integration; advocating and increasing the 
international debate around the situation of people living in river areas effected by conflict, whose declaration of 
rights were protected within the section of end of conflict guarantees.  
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The single activity in support of section (ii) showed a weak/indirect support for local level implementation of the 
respective Peace Accord, in the form of advocating for the UK government to request the Colombian government 
to invite a UN official on Human Rights. This reflects ‘track 1’, or top-level leadership, using Lederachs (1999) 
work (see fig 1, previous) and has little involvement facilitating local level involvement and implementation. 
 
4. Socialisation  
Socialisation functions were found to have been performed in nine observable and distinct occasions from 2016 
onwards. Of these nine, the most numerous (4) were in facilitation of the section (v) Agreements on the 
Reconciliation of victims, 3 for section (iv) End Of Conflict, 1 for section (vi) Implementation and Verification 
Methods, and 1 for section (ii) Increasing Political Participation. 
For positive examples found for facilitation of section (v) of the Peace Accords, all four instances were identified 
as having a clear indication of local level integration; all forms of socialisation for reconciliation of victims 
involved grass roots facilitation of local Colombian people and local Colombian civil society attempts at securing 
justice as mentioned in the relevant Peace Accord., through support of the truth and reconciliation programmes 
present already, and training and nurturing a culture of accountability in line with the Peace Accord stipulations. 
For the three activities supporting section (vi), all showed a clear level of local civil society and grass-roots 
integration, most clearly in the form of workshops and programmes intended to create ‘cultures of peace’ and 
‘peace-building initiatives’, regarding various specific areas of concern.  
For the section (vi), the one instance found did not demonstrate a local level facilitation, but was instead focused 
on a wider judicial training programme within South America, which in the Colombian context focused on 
national level, ‘tier 3’ (Lederachs 1999) integration with Colombia top leadership.  
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Finally, for the activity observed in support of section (ii), there was a clear indication of local level facilitation, 
through the ‘promotion of intergenerational dialogue’ and integration of Colombian youth in a project aimed at 
increasing awareness of democratic political processes.  
 
5. Conflict Sensitive Social Cohesion  
Only two separate examples of CSO’s performing activities related to the function of Conflict Sensitive social 
cohesion were found in the data reviewed. One of these was for section (vi) Implementation and Verification 
Methods of the Peace Accords, and 1 for the section (iii) End of Conflict. 
Both examples of CSSC found displayed distinct presence of local integration and co-operation. The work for 
section (vi) involved work with a local Colombian CSO directly, providing documents and training aimed at 
encouraging dialogue between warring parties.  
The work facilitating section (iii) was comprised of a coalition of nearly 50 people; community leaders and 
workers from various international and Colombian CSO’s, who met with the ELN (the National Liberation 
Army), a different separatist group not officially involved in the peace process agreements, to try encourage 
productive dialogue in support of acting in the stipulations as set out by section (iii) End of Conflict.  
 
6. Intermediation and Facilitation  
For the function Intermediation and Facilitation, 6 distinct examples of CS activity were found. Of these, 3 were 
in facilitation of section (i) Rural Reform, 1 for (iii) End of Conflict and 2 for (v) Reconciliation of Victims.  
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For section (i), all 3 examples found had some limited level of observable local integration, in the form of; 1 
facilitating work with national level government territory initiatives, and 1 in the form of supporting peace-
building measures with a local Colombia CSO. 
Facilitating section (iii), the 1 example found had limited degree of local CSO involvement, as it was an advocacy 
organization which directed its facilitation function in this case towards the national level peace building 
initiatives, bypassing local level activities.   
For the section (v), 1 showed local integration of involvement and 1 did not. The first example involved 
international CSO’s working with ‘level 1’ organizations (see Lederachs 1997) and did not involve any local or 
grass roots Colombian organizations or people, in the form of assessing and processing files for the Colombian 
Attorney General. The second case found in the data showed local integration through direct provision and 
facilitation for various displaced peoples, helping with legal orientation and processes. 
7. Service Provision  
For the final function identified, Service Provision, only 1 example was found, in support of facilitation of section 
(v) Reconciliation of Victims. This function is noted in the literature to be the most infrequent feature due to its 
difficulty to perform, thus this is not a surprising result. 
This case of CS mobilization demonstrated clear local level integration and support, in the form of direct cash 
transfers to a ‘local government institution’, in support of re-homing internationally displaced persons.  
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Chapter 6 
Analysis. 
My research question was ‘Have International Civil Society Organizations mobilized to facilitate an increased 
local implementation of the Peace Accords Agreement in Colombia, and if so, in what functions?’ I will answer 
this question in two sections, (I) Local Implementation, (ii) Functions, which will be interconnected with each 
other.   
From the data found, it is clear that International Civil Society has definitely mobilized in a variety of ways in 
specific reference to the Peace Accords, and has done so in an observably local manner. Overall, 39 distinct 
examples of locally focused CSO activity were found between the years 2016-2018, spanning short term 
engagements to long term plans.  Colombia’s long history of local CS activity and the West’s engagement with 
it (It is the largest receiver of aid outside of the Middle East, Afghanistan and Iraq), mean that international civil 
societies, and their hybrid model of liberal peace building explored earlier, find solid footing in Colombia.  
 
(i) The ‘locals’ role in Peace-Building, in the case of the Colombian   
Peace Accords. 
There are two main theoretical justifications given for organisations to engage the ‘local’ level of society more in 
peace building activities, that were developed in section (B) Conceptualising Post-Conflict Peace-building. 
Briefly, these are; recognising the local as an actor in peace-building initiatives, placing emphasis on the role of 
local governance structures, local capacity and local governance. The other is supporting the role of the local as 
it can be successful in peace building as an ‘expression of agency’, based on the potential that local people have 
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in sustaining and ingraining the normative values that encompass long term peace building operations. Overall, 
international Civil Society’s engagement of local projects was, regardless of either justification, quite pronounced 
in the examples reviewed for the data. In the case of Colombia, based on the data found in reference to the research 
question, international Civil society’s worked in both theoretical areas of the ‘local’ in peace building integration 
theory.  
International Civil Society work found focused in some cases on the concept of supporting local capacity and 
ownership; this theory of local capacity and ownership inclusion in peace building measures works through 
strengthening the involvement of local government and societal structures, and is favoured by various 
organisations (such as the UN) who see it as chiefly increasing ‘service delivery, democratic representation and 
conflict prevention’ (Leonardsson and Rudd, 2015 pp. 827-828).  
Local capacity is achieved through decentralisation of power, which creates ‘sub-national areas for citizen-state 
interaction’ (Ibid, pp. 829). This decentralisation can occur in different forms; for the purpose of this research, 
the World Bank for example interprets it as the need to invest in ‘local actors and NGOS’ (World Bank, The State 
and Peace building Fund), to create this sub-national space. To succeed, this local capacity must be visibly linked 
to local ownership, and for local capacity building to work effectively, the ownership must be represented at every 
stage of peace-building (UN Review of the United Nations Peace building Architecture). It is not without critique, 
(see Leonardsson and Rudd 2015, pp. 829-831 for a review of the literature), and specifically has been noted to 
reproduce the power and agency imbalance that has led to the criticisms of a ‘liberal peace model’ as explored in 
the literature review previously. We can see how these elements of local capacity building at the ‘sub-national 
level’ are present in some of the examples of international civil societies working in support of the Colombian 
Peace Accords; 
In the case of ownership, FFORP’s report conclusively titled ‘This land is their land; the Case for local 
indigenous ownership’ (Peace Presence, 2017), makes direct reference to the claim to land that many indigenous 
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people rightly have. 10 Swiss CSO’s worked with local Colombian CSO’s to strengthen local capacity through ‘ 
organizational development of grass-roots groups’ and ‘establishing community structures’ ‘sustainable 
agriculture’ and  ‘strengthening civil society organizations’ (Swiss Peace, Feb 2017). The MBBI Rotary 
International American Arbitration Association funded the training of 31 participants to ‘increase their capacity’ 
(MBBI 2017) as peace builders and mediators in conflict situations. 
Work by ‘Berghoff conflict research’, in conjunction with a local Colombian CSO Propaxz, also focused on local 
capacity building; supporting departmental and municipal administrations in supporting peace building within 
development plans for ‘territorial peace initiatives’ (Berghoff, 2017). Watch list’s work focused on increasing 
local capacity and ability to contribute towards peace building measures of 44 participants, from ‘school teachers, 
social activists, community workers, and representatives from local and international NGOs,’. They were taught 
how to monitor and report grave violations of human rights against children (Watch List, 2017). This ‘local 
capacity’ building approach is also notably observable in the example of the Mercy Corps ‘Integrated 
Humanitarian Assistance BPRM XII’ a project focused on providing humanitarian resistance to IDPS, via 
‘capacity building for local (own emphasis added) government institutions’ (Mercy Corps, 2017) 
 
 The other theoretical understanding of the local’s effective role in peace building comes in the form of the 
‘emancipation’ of the local and ‘derives from the notion of local agency as crucial in peace building’ 
(Leonardsson and Rudd, 2015 pp.832). It is a ‘bottom-up’’ approach that is centered on expressions, and listening 
to the voices of, those ‘below’. This is the kind most likely to involve the observable work of international NGO’s, 
as their ‘supportive role’ in peace building is, as explored earlier (see Paffenholz 2009), is more likely to interact 
‘from below’ with local society. This concept of ‘local’ agency is linked to the concept of the sub-altern and a 
critical evaluation of international ‘liberal peace models’, which is a top-down and in the long-term, ineffective 
peace sustaining model.  Accordingly, this is what most of the activities found in the case of Colombia can be 
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categorised as. Colombia’s strong civil society, and the delicate nature of the Peace Accords mean that in the 
place of strong local governments, local people’s experiences and integration into the measures of the peace 
accord are prominent as desired peace-building measures.  
The numerous letters (PaxChristi 2017, ABColombia 3-8), petitions, endorsements and, in one case, parallel 
human rights report (ABColombia 9) produced by various groups from the years 2016-2018 highlight the way 
local integration of peace building from an ‘expression of agency and emancipation’ brought the local community 
to the forefront., as all these letters and petitions involved local groups and people and allowed them to get their 
views expressed on an international platform.  
In the example from the civil society organisation ‘WOLA’, (which involved directly the local community and 
support of local groups), in a letter to Vice-President elect of the USA Mike Pence , they demanded that he should 
address the high levels of assassination and murder of Colombian political and human rights activists. 
Specifically, this letter stressed the need to support and protect the rights of Afro-Colombian and Indigenous 
people in expressing their rights and agency (WOLA, April 2018). This group also published lists of attacks on 
members of ‘Black Communities Process’, a group in Colombia which has ties to WOLA (WOLA, May 2015). 
A coalition of social organisations met up with ELN leaders to provide a bridge of dialogue between local people 
and the militia group, placing the negotiations, and thus potential peace building activities, on a grass roots level 
(PaxChristi 2017b).  
In May 2017, FFROP sent out accompaniments to the Naya River alongside two local Colombian Civil Society 
organisations. There work consisted of ‘putting up flags’, acting as a visible deterrent to militias groups that had 
conducted murders and kidnappings of four members, and helping investigate other possible crimes (FFROP 
2015a).  Again this work can be contextualised as emphasising the agency and activities of the human rights 
defenders who have gone missing, rather than supporting larger more regional or national bodies which may be 
involved in the rescue process. They also produced a report denouncing the attacks on what can arguably be one 
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of the clearest manifestation of a ‘local as agency’ peace building exercise, an ‘experimentos’ explored earlier, 
the San Jove peace community (FFROP, 2015b) 
Supporting the peace building potential in increased emancipation, in the Colombia context manifested many 
times specifically on the issues of marginalised and dis-empowered groups. These are mainly youths (between 
the ages of 16-24) and women. The marginalisation of women in particular, in ‘Peace Building’ discourse and 
practice, is a noted issue; research shows that overall, their access to the channels and benefits of peace building 
activities is restricted due to various social, political and other factors (Justino, Mitchell and Müller 2018). In 
terms of ‘liberal-peace approaches’, undertaken by organisations such as the UN, post-colonial feminist analysis 
show that women’s identities and characters are used as a ‘hegemonic rhetoric device’  to support liberal 
intervention (Hudson 2012), and thus there inclusion in peace building is in rhetoric only. Thus, work in Colombia 
with women shows various examples of attempts at peace building through increasing local emancipation in a 
distinctly ‘bottom-up approach; work by ‘Conciliation Resources’ focused on empowering women’s groups 
specifically, through the ‘’Truth, Memory and Reconciliation Commission of Colombian Women in the 
Diaspora’’,  an international project which supports agency and emancipation of Colombian women who have 
been effected by the conflict by allowing them to tell their own stories; it collected a total of ‘84 testimonies’, and 
involved 400 different women across London and Barcelona (Conciliation Resources Annual Report, 2017). The 
Mercy Corps ‘Rural Women’s program’ worked to strengthen the ‘autonomy and empowerment’ of rural 
women’s groups in Colombia (Mercy Corps, 2017b). GNWP developed a toolkit of analysis for the monitoring 
of ‘resolution 1325’, a clause within the Peace Accords which dealt with the implementation of gender equality 
and participation of women in the final agreement (GNWP 2017).  Both these peace building strategies were 
based on the idea of giving agency to the women, which would in turn encourage ‘gender equity’ and an inclusive 
development program which would contribute to peace. 
On the issue of youths, work by La Paz Querida and GPPAC’s had a joint project which sought to increase the 
agency of Colombian youth, and integrate the local in this case by increasing their involvement in local and 
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national politics, getting their voices heard. One international CSO’s (Y care International) work with a local 
Colombian CSO was targeted at ‘at risk’ youths, providing lessons and support to learn business skills and provide 
education on a variety of issues, aimed at preventing ‘exploitation’ (Y Care International). 
We can also use examples of local integration to develop our understanding of how local level peace building 
actually operationalizes. For example, in one of the cases categorised as within the function of protection, the 
local activity undertaken was the provision of accompaniments by CSO ‘SweFor!’ working with ‘local defenders’ 
of human rights activism. This data was derived from an interview with one of these accompaniments, which 
provides a useful narrative of the process of local integration (SweFor, 2018). In providing international 
accompaniment, they are putting potential human rights abuses in their words; ‘in the spotlight of the international 
community’ (ibid, 2018). This is the way that most hybrid efforts at CS peace building work locally, by increasing 
the audience and visibility of a local group through their international connections.  
 
(ii) Observable Functions. 
There was evidence of at least one instance of each of the 7 different functions that civil society can perform, in 
regards to facilitating the Peace Accords, found in my research. Out of these, the top three most common were 
Advocacy (with 10 examples), Socialisation (with 9 examples), and Monitoring/Early Warning systems (with 8 
examples found). In my hypothesis, I predicted that the most prevalent would be; Monitoring/Early Warning 
Systems, Facilitation and Advocacy, along with a notable number of Protection examples also observable. Whilst 
my prediction for ‘Monitoring/Early Warning’ and ‘Advocacy’ were correct, the prevalence of ‘Socialisation’, 
and the lack of Protection and Facilitation functions (only 3 were found for protection, and 6 for Facilitation) 
will be explored in further detail, along with the correct predictions. 
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Advocacy (10 cases found)  
The proliferation of observable Advocacy functions in the case of Colombia also fit the expected hypothesis, as 
this is a ‘core function’ of peace building and Civil society activity (Aall 2001; Paffenholz 2003, quoted in World 
Bank 2007) thus likely to be present. International efforts at Advocacy are argued to focus on, and be successful 
when, they target ‘specific conflict issues’ (World Bank 2007, pp.15), which can be clearly identified in this case 
as facilitation of each of the 7 specific issues of the Peace Accords. 
One of the recognized achievements of advocacy work in civil society, in particular in peace building operations, 
is its function in helping promote so called ‘democratic norms’. The way in which Advocacy and civil society 
function is key in constructing these democratic norms; as argued by Zompetti, a fundamental notion of 
democracy is ‘discussion and development’ of arguments, produced in a free space. This free space is he 
recognises as the realm of civil society, a ‘third space’ (Zompetti 2006, pp.180) and advocacy functions as ‘the 
lynchpin for preparing and delivering arguments’ (Ibid 2006, pp. 179). The Peace Accords, as well as containing 
‘practical’, technical measures to rebuild Colombian society (for example Section 1, in the form of methods and 
quotas of land redistribution), are equally imbued with sections which promote a more ‘normative’ agenda. 
Section 2, for example, outlines the plan for increasing ‘Political Participation’. Whilst this section contains 
specific practical plans, (such as grants for community work encouraging citizen participation), it also has 
demonstrates the distinctive normative element, promising the creation of a ‘democratic and participatory 
political culture’ (Summary of Colombia’s Peace Agreement).  Section 5, ‘Regarding the Victims of Conflict’, 
as well as listing ‘technical’ solutions, also promises for example more vague ‘commitment to the promotion, 
respect and guarantee for Human Rights’ (Ibid, pp.31). This normative element plays out in the advocacy 
examples found.  
In practice, the cases of the Advocacy function found often worked in tandem with monitoring activities, 
advocating often on behalf of the groups that they had monitored the scale of abuses against, specifically 
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marginalised groups, and then using their international presence to draw attention to and put pressure on those 
who purported or had failed to uphold sections of the peace accords. Many of the examples found directed their 
advocacy efforts towards the ‘1st tier’ level of leadership found in Peace-building discourse (represented in figure 
(i), Lederach 1997), thereby functioning by taking ‘local level’ issues, and acting as a channel through which their 
grievances could be legitimately projected, and brought to a larger audience and towards larger and more official 
bodies. In this way, the ‘third space’ as mentioned by Zompetti becomes realised, as civil society as a zone of 
dialogue directs the arguments  towards these ‘tier 1’ leadership organisations, and in doing so opens up a space 
for discussion on issues that may not have originally penetrated the discussion space of these groups.  For 
example, the high levels of killings facing local Colombian Human Rights defenders (HRD’s) (ABColombia3) 
was brought to the attention of the Colombian Government and the UN Security Council, who were then urged 
to act on it accordingly.   Other letters from the same organisation called on State Judicial officials to investigate 
fully disappearance’s and killings of ‘9-18 peasant farmers in Alto Mira Y Frontera, allegedly at the hands of the 
Colombian Police Force’ (ABColombia12), as well as activity pushing for the state to publish its material 
regarding violence against HRD’s (ABColombia 4) and advocated on behalf of victims for all people to be 
incriminated in actions, not just commanders (ABColombia2). Other CSO activity involved advocating on behalf 
of gender issues and presenting recommendations to the Colombian government (Conciliation Resources), 
‘NOREF’ producing reports on behalf of attempts and progress of the re-integration of FARC members (NOREF 
2018), as well as work advocating on behalf of bio-cultural and land recognition rights (ABColombia8, PaxChristi 
2017) for rural peasants.  All of these operate in a way to increase awareness, which in turn increases the potential 
for a more democratic, ‘political participation’ climate to be realised through a shared perception of issues. 
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Socialisation (9 cases found) 
The function of Socialisation works by building a culture of peace, through initiating dialogues, ‘building 
bridges’, and is most effective and prevalent after conflict has ended (World Bank 2007). In the case of facilitating 
the Peace Accords, it therefore makes sense for this function to be prevalent. A ‘Culture of Peace’ is a normative 
concept, similar to the attempts of the Advocacy function in creating an atmosphere of democratic accountability. 
In this function though, the normative element of socialisation can best be expressed through using the concept 
of ‘social capital’, as described by Fukuyama. This is at its most basic an ‘instantiated informal norm that 
promotes cooperation between two or more individuals’ (Fukuyama 2000, pp.3-4). Encouraging, or creating 
Social Capital, involves the ‘promotion of co-operation and reconstruction of a society’ (Ibid 2000), and in the 
Colombian peace-building context, this is exactly what the Accords set out to do. 
As explored earlier, this attempt at a peace negotiation between the FARC-EP and the Colombian State was not 
the first. Previous failures, amongst other things, shared a lack of consideration of the ‘powerful subjection 
dynamics’, i.e., the grievances and views of those most affected, local civilians. This led to the current Accords 
being much more inclusive and having a normative agenda.  Thus, the Accords were as much about reconciliation 
between the fighting factions and building peace as they were about the laying down of arms; the summary 
document of the Accords puts this succinctly; ‘The Summary of Colombia's Agreement to End Conflict and Build 
Peace’ (Own emphasis added.) The aims of constructing a dialogue for reconciliation, and inducing ‘Social 
Capital’ were included clearly in the final document; Section 3, ‘End of Conflict’ contains detailed clauses for 
both ‘Political’, ‘Economic’ and ‘Social’ re-incorporation of the FARC-EP, aiming for a full transition of them 
into regular civilian life (Summary Document, pp.19-20). Section 5, Agreement Regarding the Victims of 
Conflict’, lays out a ‘comprehensive plan’ for a truth, justice and reconciliation mechanism which aims to ‘help 
facilitate social coexistence’ (Ibid, pp29). 
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The numerous provisions from the Accords focusing on facilitation and reconciliation can be linked to this 
concept of Socialisation and ‘Social Capital’, and explains the proliferation of this function, as it is a clearly 
defined objective based on its inclusion in the Accords and has been taken up by Civil Society. For example, the 
work by La Paz Querida and GPPAC, a combination of a locally and internationally based civil society 
organisation, held workshops aimed to promote ‘inter-generational dialogue’, discourse between young 
Colombian people and older ones, with the expressed intention of promoting political participation to eventually 
effect policy on a ‘national level’ (La Paz Querida 2017). Conciliation Resources, another CSO directly 
participated in Section 5 of the Accords, initiating a project called the ‘Truth, Memory and Reconciliation 
Commission of Colombian Women in the Diaspora’, which collected testimonials over 400 Colombian women in 
exile to contribute to the State sponsored Truth and Reconciliation Commission that was set up to deal with 
survivor testimonials (Conciliation Resources). Whilst I will not cover all cases found, they all follow a similar 
theme, attempting to construct social capital amongst victims, especially those marginalised, the ‘powerful 
subjection dynamics’ who were ignored in the previous failed attempts at peace; Mercy Corps initiated a rural 
women's project, which sought economic empowerment and autonomy amongst rural women South of the Cacua, 
to ensure inclusion in discussions on rural developments (Mercy Corps).  
 
Monitoring/Early Warning Functions (8 cases found). 
During all phases of armed conflict and subsequent phases of peace, the performative function of 
Monitoring/Early warning systems have a consistent level of relevance and activity (Paffenholz 2009), thus was 
predicted to be clearly observable. In particular, the presence of monitoring functions during the ‘peace’ phase of 
hostilities (as is the case in my research) is found to be most likely observed when there is still a ‘high level’ of 
residual violence (Ibid pp.11). This is the case in Colombia; numerous observers and reports, dated from 
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November the years of 2016 to April 2018, the period after the Peace Accords begin to take place, reveal the 
continued extent of violence occurring, which is identified in particular as specifically effecting; displaced peoples 
(Forero 2018) and minorities (HRW Report 2017 & 2018, Amnesty International 2017/18) most of all. Despite 
the efforts made, there is continued military and guerrilla conflict, with other smaller paramilitary groups filling 
in the role of the demobilising FARC militants, (and the matching continued government violence) (FARC Deal, 
Guardian 2018), and violence is often targeted towards civilians from both state and non-state sources. 
Civil society can act through a monitoring function to check whether public officials are complying with their 
official duties. In particular, compliance with human rights agenda’s is at the forefront; Scholte mentions how 
this can come in various forms, including for example, submissions of parallel human rights reports to challenge 
counter-narratives or monitoring accounts and actions (Shcolte 2004, pp.219). In the case of Colombia, a parallel 
human rights report (from a coalition of over 40 local and international CSO organisations), all which focus in 
some way on highlighting and recording the scale of human rights abuses against local Colombians was produced. 
This Parallel human right report, the ‘UPR’, monitors the actions of ‘neo-paramilitaries’ (in particular the ELN), 
which continue to commit ‘serious and massive violations of human rights and international humanitarian law’, 
as well as the problems of displacement of civilians and anti-personnel mines (UPR pp.5-7).  
Furthermore, monitoring functions can work by revealing ‘shortfalls, incompetence (or) harm’ (ibid, pp.10). 
Many of the examples of Monitoring/Early Warning systems activity found reflect the continued violence that is 
occurring despite an ‘official’ end to hostilities, and the lack of action, shortfall, of the Colombian government in 
adequately dealing with the violence being committed. These activities included for example; sending physical 
accompaniments to monitor abuses (CSO’s such as FFROP and CONPAZ, SweFor) to producing numerous 
letters, addressed to important political figures detailing abuses committed (ABColombia2). It also acts to monitor 
the failings of the Columbian government to act decisively in these areas, and fulfil the related sections of the 
Peace Accords (Ibid).  
 52 
Conclusion 
 Overall, the functions most observable demonstrate the way in which international civil society organizations are 
most prevalent in facilitating the implementation of the Peace Accords; The prevalence of Advocacy, Socialization 
and Monitoring functions reflect the direction of ICS as geared towards promoting. This normative angle present 
in the most prevalent civil society activity also reflects in some way the limited ability of ICS to fully engage in 
all aspects of the Peace Accords; naturally, many of the technical and practical details and goals of the Accord 
need to be fulfilled by an entity with greater physical resources; the lack of service provision function further 
echoes this point. Thus CS operates most visibly in lesser roles, roles which, as explored in the literature review, 
reflect its position as a ‘supportive’ body, rather than one which leads change independently.  
On another level, this normative angle also reflects the ‘liberal-local’ hybrid approach found in the academic 
literature. As is clear from the research, the engagement of local level actors in practically all the ICS activities 
is visible, accounting for the ‘local’, but the push for democratic accountability and norms can be traced to the 
‘liberal’ nature of the ICS, that is, there western based ideology and donor dependence.  ICS functions in this 
normative role to facilitate greater local engagement with the Peace Accords, focused on the elements which most 
similarly resemble the political and cultural climate that these western organizations are based in, that is greater 
social capital, more democratic accountability and greater democratic norm diffusion. 
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